

# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE



# Bulletin

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# Freedom—The Predominant Force

*Statement by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

## Introduction

The world is today changing more rapidly than ever before. But the fact that much is changing does not mean that everything has changed. There are certain values, certain principles, that are enduring. Among these are the concepts of individual human dignity and the supremacy of moral law.

In a changing world our task is to strive resolutely that change shall increasingly reflect the basic principles to which our nation has, from its origin, been dedicated.

## II. Our Basic Purposes

(1) At a time when war involves unacceptable risks for all humanity, we work to build a stable world order.

(2) We seek for general acceptance of the concept of individual dignity which will lead to the spread of responsible freedom and personal liberty.

(3) We seek that the free nations shall attain a more rapid rate of economic growth, so that their independence will be more secure and vigorous and so that there will be greater opportunities for cultural and spiritual development.

## III. The Primary Threat

The Soviet Union and Communist China are expanding their economic and industrial power at a very rapid pace. They do so by a system which combines governmental rule of all labor with imposed austerity. This makes it possible greatly to accelerate capital developments.

There is emphasis, too, on quality. A spectacular product of Soviet material accomplishment was its recent space probe. In this field, the United States is still trying to "catch up" and make up for the head start of the Soviets. Our "space" accomplishments during the past year justify the belief that we are making good relative progress.

The Chinese Communists seem to be going into a dark night of massed regimentation and forced labor. What they call "the great leap forward" is in reality a tragic fall backward into the abyss of human slavery.

Asian nations are experiencing one aspect of Communist economic development: the Communist tactic of flooding their market places with goods at less than prevailing prices. This has widespread effects, some of which reach into our own country. As one example only, the dumping of cotton textiles in Southeast Asia has reduced Japanese exports in that area and is already reducing exports of cotton from the United States to Japan. As Communist economic power grows, we must anticipate and plan for further shocks to the free-world economic structure from the Communist trade offensive.

Communist economic methods involve costs in human privation and misery that, for us, are not only repugnant but completely unacceptable. We believe that over the long run such a process must inevitably be altered. Already there are indications that the Soviet leaders are beginning to realize this. There is some scaling down of their heavy-industry ambitions. They are beginning to heed demands by workers and peasants for more leisure and for a greater share in the fruits of their labor. Peoples sufficiently educated to operate a modern industrial state may be expected also to

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Jan. 14 (press release 31).

acquire the desire for freedom and the capacity to get it. History gives us good reason to believe that the Soviet peoples will not indefinitely submit to dictatorial rule by the international Communist Party leadership. It would appear that the Communists will encounter difficulties increasing in the long run.

But for the short run—and this may be a period of years—the situation is full of danger.

That means that we may face a period even harder than we have become used to. To get advantage from time we shall have to stand on our course. We shall need the national will to stand firm in the face of aggressive threats and probings from the Sino-Soviet bloc. We shall need to make whatever unusual sacrifices may be necessary. People respond to this kind of demand when they understand that a temporary emergency requires it. But these burdens seem to grow heavier the longer they must be borne during a period of relative peace. Our people will need to show what freedom can mean in terms of self-sacrifice and self-discipline and in terms of fortitude and perseverance.

#### IV. World Order

Let me speak now about world order. This requires an elimination of the use or threat of force to accomplish international change. This was always a bad method. It has become an intolerable method because the force at man's disposal could now practically obliterate human life on this planet.

The United States and other free-world nations have, by their conduct, done much to establish, for themselves, the principle of the renunciation of aggressive force; and they have shown their ability and will to deter such use of force by others.

At the time of the Suez affair and the Israeli-Egyptian hostilities, the United Kingdom and France, and then Israel, responding to the overwhelming opinion of the United Nations, withdrew their armed forces and accepted a United Nations solution. This may well prove to be a historical landmark.

During the past year the United States and its partners have further shown their opposition to change through force or the threat of force.

When Lebanon and Jordan seemed threatened from without and appealed to the United States and the United Kingdom for emergency aid, we

responded with promptness and efficiency. When the emergency was relieved by United Nations action, we promptly withdrew our forces.

Throughout the world small nations felt a profound sense of reassurance.

In the Far East the Chinese Communists, with Soviet backing, initiated military action designed, as they put it, to "expel the United States" from the western Pacific. We stood beside the Republic of China as it resisted what seemed the preliminaries of that attack. Our free-world associates generally supported our position that change in that area should not be effected by force of arms.

The Government of the Republic of China itself made a notable contribution when, last October, it declared that it relied primarily upon peaceful principles and not upon force to secure the freeing of the mainland.<sup>2</sup> This courageous and statesmanlike act has strengthened the free world's cause in the western Pacific.

Now in Berlin we face an effort to "expel" the small Western contingents in West Berlin. Their presence constitutes an indispensable safeguard to the freedom of that city. The NATO powers, at their December meeting, unanimously vowed that such expulsion should be resisted.<sup>3</sup>

Step by step, discernible progress continues to be made in consolidating a system of collective security which will effectively operate to exclude the use of force to effect international changes.

The mutual security arrangements which we have with free-world countries no longer assume the aspect of mere military alliances. They are the framework of consultative processes that, day by day, are steadily re-forming the society of free nations.

In primitive and frontier societies security is on an individual basis. Each householder defends himself by his own means. That primitive formula is now obsolete domestically. It is becoming obsolete internationally. Many free nations combine to help each other. The resultant power is not a power which can be or would be used for any aggressive or nationalistic purpose. It is a power dedicated to the common welfare as mutually agreed.

<sup>2</sup> For a U.S.-Republic of China joint communique and a statement by Secretary Dulles, see *BULLETIN* of Nov. 10, 1958, p. 721.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1959, p. 3.



The United States has repeatedly made clear—and I said this again at the last December NATO meeting—that we regard our own military power as being a trust for the benefit of our free-world partnerships; that we are ready to make known to all the defensive purposes and circumstances under which that force might be used; and that we shall heed in this respect the advice and counsel of our partners just as we would expect them to heed our advice and counsel with respect to the international use of their force.

Thus, out of what may originally have been conceived primarily as military alliances, there is developing an international structure which provides collective security on the basis of organized and continuous collective consultation. That is something new in history.

I might add that accomplishment is not always easy, given the variety of national development and national viewpoints. Nevertheless the free-world practice in this regard constantly grows in efficiency.

World order is not, however, assured merely by the elimination of violence. There must be processes of peaceful change. These, too, are rapidly developing within the free world. The General Assembly of the United Nations is a forum where these needs find effective expression. The General Assembly does not have the power to legislate change. But it has a capacity to induce change, at least in the case of governments which have respect for, and are responsive to, world opinion.

The peace of the free world is not a peace of political stagnation or a peace which sanctifies the *status quo*. It is a peace characterized by peaceful change reflecting new human aspirations and potentialities.

There is, of course, need not only for processes which permit of peaceful change, but there is equally a need for stability in adherence to basic values, including that of respecting international agreements and treaties. This requires that, unless international law and treaty engagements are changed by common agreement, they should be respected.

There has not been as great a development of international law and recourse to judicial processes as would be desirable. The United Nations General Assembly committee on the codification of international law has made little progress.

Some significant progress in law development was made at the recent Law of the Sea Conference, and that conference will be resumed in 1960.<sup>4</sup> Inadequate use has been made of the International Court of Justice. As the President said last week in his state-of-the-Union address,<sup>5</sup> we envisage further steps to encourage the greater use of that Court.

In such ways as I describe progress is being made toward establishing a world order where peace rests, not on mere expediency or on a balance of power, but on a basis of sound institutions.

This evolution is not spectacular and rarely considered "news." What attracts attention are the aggressive probings of the Communists and the free-world reactions thereto. That gives the impression that our foreign policy consists primarily of reacting to Communist initiatives.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The fact is that, day by day, month by month, and year by year, we are building, quietly but steadily, in the United Nations, in NATO, in the OAS, in SEATO, and other organs of consultation, the solid foundations of an international order based upon justice and law as substitutes for force.

The Communist rulers do not share in this effort to build a stable world order based upon justice and law. International communism avowedly seeks worldwide dictatorship. The concept of justice is alien to the Communist creed, and law, in our sense of that word, is unknown. The free-world and Communist concepts are mutually antagonistic.

This, however, does not mean that there cannot be useful contacts and negotiations with the Communists. We have had many such. We are striving to make progress in the field of disarmament and in that connection deal with the Soviets, particularly in relation to the controlled discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. We also seek agreement on possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack.

At Warsaw we negotiate with the Chinese Communists.

We have made clear our willingness to negotiate about the German question.

<sup>4</sup>For statements made by Herman Phleger, U.S. Representative to the General Assembly, during debate in the General Assembly on the question of convening a second Law of the Sea Conference and text of a resolution, see *ibid.*, Jan. 12, 1959, p. 64.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, Jan. 26, 1959, p. 115.

We have now an agreement with the Soviet Union on cultural and scientific exchanges which is operating satisfactorily.<sup>6</sup> Also important are the visits to and from Russia of influential citizens.

President Eisenhower urged this in his letter of February 15, 1958,<sup>7</sup> to the then Soviet Premier [Nikolai A. Bulganin]. Following this initiative, there have been useful visits on both sides, and we are glad that the First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, Mr. [Anastas] Mikoyan, is now here learning about our country. We would like to see a broader exchange of students. We believe that in such ways false premises and miscalculations can be reduced in the interest of peace.

#### **V. The Inevitable Movement Toward Freedom**

I turn now to our second major purpose.

One of the strongest forces working in the world today is the movement toward independence and freedom.

This force is notably manifest in Africa. Here change is rapid; new states are arising almost overnight. This great continent presents a challenge to the United States to do its best to assist the peoples now emerging into independence and new opportunity.

Another such area is our hemisphere to the south. The peoples of Latin America are making clear their determination to control their own destinies. One by one dictatorships have made way for governments more responsive to the popular will.

This worldwide movement toward freedom is accompanied by a growing awareness of the deadly nature of Sino-Soviet imperialism. The leaders of the new freedom are coming more and more to see international communism as an immediate threat to their liberties, not, as some have thought, a mere bogeyman of so-called "Western imperialism."

The Communists are paying a price for the forced growth of their material power: There is a developing fear in the less powerful nations around the world of the dangerous combination of burgeoning economic and military power with the imperialist drive of the Communists for world dominion. This menacing combination brings

home with force the threat which, when the Communists were not so strong, was but a matter of vague and largely academic concern.

There has recently been a surprising clarification of understanding around the world of the real purpose of Communist leaders—to subject all the world to the dominant influence and control of international communism, with its primary power centers at Moscow and Peiping.

In the Middle East the deadly designs of communism are now far more clearly realized than a year ago.

In Southeast Asia liberty-loving peoples are struggling—and with success—to remain masters in their newly built national homes.

In general, I believe the leaders and peoples of Asia now understand better the sincerity of American policy favoring their independence and our willingness to support unconditionally their efforts to stay free and do so in their own way, which may indeed be a non-Western way.

In France, we are witnessing an inspiring example of national renewal.

The tide of freedom is running strong in Western Europe as Communist strength there ebbs.

Even in Communist countries there is a powerful and persistent craving for greater national freedom. Yugoslavia has been steadfast against all threats and blandishments from Moscow and has courageously maintained its independence. Hungary's great effort to throw off its shackles, even though crushed by force, has been an inspiration and a tribute to man's unquenchable thirst for liberty. And throughout the bloc, even in the U.S.S.R., revisionism is a living force and ferment. Moscow considers it a deadly enemy, and with reason.

The pull of freedom is daily manifested in the flow of refugees from the Communist bloc to the free world.

The free people of West Berlin have, during years of uncertainty and danger, been an inspiring beacon light for all those whose liberties have been lost to Communist tyranny. We are determined that this light shall not fail and that Berlin shall not be engulfed in the Red undertow.

As we look ahead, we see freedom as a pre-dominant force, shaping our 20th-century world. As Americans, we have faith that the aspiration, deep within the soul of man, to live freely and with dignity in a just and peaceful world is

<sup>6</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1958, p. 373.

stronger than all the material forces which the Communists invoke as the pledge and promise of their power.

## **VI. Economic Progress**

I turn now to our third basic purpose.

We believe that economic progress is a necessary condition of stable and free nations. There must also be acceptance of economic interdependence of nations. No nation can live completely to itself.

Unless and until the less developed areas reach the stage of self-sustaining economic growth, the world as a whole will suffer. For the inhabitants of those areas, an increasing rate of economic development has become an essential condition of free societies. The demand for economic and social betterment is now universal, and, if progress cannot be achieved in freedom, it will be sought by methods that jeopardize freedom.

The Communists are fully aware of the universal demand for progress, and they point to the Soviet and Chinese Communist accomplishments in industrialization as proof that their way is better than the way of freedom.

Our aid and investment must continue to support the efforts of the leaders of the developing free nations to sustain their peoples' confidence that economic progress can be attained in freedom.

We have not been alone in providing such support. Other highly industrialized states have made significant contributions.

These industrialized nations have also shown a growing awareness of interdependence among themselves. This is particularly gratifying to us. A Common Market for Europe was one of the policy objectives stated in the preamble to the European Recovery Act of 1948. Now, after 10 years, the six-nation European Common Market is a fact. The Western European currencies have become more freely exchangeable, and there is a strong movement for broader economic cooperation in Western Europe.

Free-world economic progress does not permit complacency or relaxation. It calls instead for renewed effort to increase the forward momentum.

In the years ahead we must through our trade and financial policies continue to promote recognition and positive use of the benefits of interdependence. These benefits and the inevitability of

economic interdependence become more clear each year. What is being done in the European Community of Six provides an example and an inspiration for greater economic cooperation elsewhere in the world.

We must continue to apply our will, energy, treasure, and techniques to the problems of the less developed areas. The cause of freedom can be won—or could be lost—in these areas.

## **VII. Conclusion**

Let me in conclusion recall the basic purposes underlying our policies:

(1) The renunciation of aggressive force and the substitution of collective institutions of peace, justice, and law among nations;

(2) Promotion of the concept of human dignity, worth, and freedom;

(3) Stimulation of economic growth and interdependence to create enlarged opportunities for realization of cultural and spiritual values.

These goals are not attainable in a few years but will require decades and perhaps even generations. Why is this so? We are but one nation among nearly a hundred sovereignties and but a scant 6 percent of the world's land surface and population. Our foreign policy is not something we can enact into world law or dictate to other peoples. It means rather constant adjustment to forces which, though beyond our control to direct, we can influence through wise statesmanship and adherence to sound principles. With our immense wealth and power, and even more because of our spiritual heritage of faith and freedom, we can exert a shaping influence on the world of the future.

The price of failure would be the destruction of all our other national objectives. While mustering all our resources, both material and spiritual, we must press on with courage to build surer foundations for the interdependent world community of which we are part. This will call for austerity and sacrifice on the part of all. We must put first things first.

Our purpose, ultimately and at all times, should be to use our great power, without abusing or presuming upon it, to move steadily toward lasting peace, orderly freedom, and growing opportunity. Thus do we achieve our constitutional purpose "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."



## Secretary Dulles' News Conference of January 13

Press release 28 dated January 13

*Secretary Dulles:* I am sorry that there has been so considerable an interval between this and my last preceding press conference. I hope that will not happen again. I surmise that quite a few questions have accumulated—perhaps more than I can handle. But I will do the best I can; so go ahead.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your approach—what is the United States approach to the talks at the end of this week with Mr. Mikoyan?*<sup>1</sup>

A. We expect in these talks to conclude the exchange of views which started when he was here before and when I talked with him and when he talked with the Vice President and our Ambassador to the Soviet Union [Llewellyn E. Thompson], who was also present at that time.

I think that the main purpose of these talks—certainly as we see it—is to get an understanding of what is in their minds and if possible to get them to understand what is in our minds. We don't look upon these talks as negotiations. We are not engaged in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union in regard to matters that equally, and to some extent even more, concern others than ourselves. But we do think it is in the general interest to have a meeting of minds so that we at least understand each other and thereby eliminate the danger of miscalculations and inadvertent mistakes. There are enough real reasons for difficulty between us not to have them enhanced by what may be artificial and unreal misunderstandings.

### U.S. Views on German Problem

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does that view offer a possi-*

<sup>1</sup> Anastas Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., made an unofficial visit to the United States from Jan. 4 to 20, during which time he talked with Secretary Dulles on Jan. 5 and on Jan. 16, with President Eisenhower on Jan. 17, and with Under Secretary Dillon and Secretary of Commerce Lewis E. Strauss on Jan. 19.

*bility that you or the President would put forward to Mr. Mikoyan to take back to Moscow any new approach to the Berlin or German problems, or would you expect him to put forward anything of a similar nature on the Soviet plan?*

A. Well, of course I cannot tell what he may put forward. As far as we are concerned, we have only to put forward our general approach—our general views about the situation—not specific proposals which we would have to clear first with our allies.

*Q. Is there any effort being made with our allies to create some new proposals?*

A. Well, we are having constant talks with our allies about the situation, and there are meetings, as an example, going on on this general topic before the permanent North Atlantic Council organization on almost a daily basis. We are talking almost on a daily basis with the ambassadors of the principally interested countries. So the situation is in a very active state.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that actually we don't have at this point any counterproposals—that we are standing on our position previously and that we are just testing what change, if any, there may be in the Soviet approach?*

A. Well, we are standing of course on the proposal and statement which we made—the allied powers made—with the approval of all the members of NATO, which was made I think on the last day of December.<sup>2</sup> That proposal is not very old at the present time, and we are not at the present time submitting any alteration of that proposal.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how about the proposals which were made at the Foreign Ministers meeting which followed the Geneva summit meeting of 1955?*<sup>3</sup> *Do those still stand in your view, or would*

<sup>2</sup> For texts of the U.S. note of Dec. 31 and the Soviet note of Nov. 27, see BULLETIN of Jan. 19, 1959, p. 79.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the proposals made by France, the U.K., and the U.S., see *ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1955, p. 729.



*they have to be reviewed in the light of the present conditions?*

A. There are certain basic aspects of those proposals which I think remain valid, and I would expect that they would continue to survive because of their basic validity. The basic proposition, as I recall, was, first, that Germany ought to be reunified; secondly, we could not expect reunification under conditions which would involve, or seem to involve, the Soviet Union in increased risks or losses. Therefore it would be appropriate to couple any reunification of Germany with security provisions and limitations which would make sure that the Soviet Union would not, through the reunification, seem to have weakened its strategic or political position.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Mikoyan seems to have made quite an impact on American influential business people around the country. I wonder if you could tell us whether you have any concern about this impact in terms of future policy toward the Soviet Union.*

A. I have not myself had any direct reports from any of these business people that you speak of to confirm what has been the nature of the impact that he made. He does speak, particularly through his interpreter, in terms that are appealing in many respects. I think that probably the talks have been good because I think that they have also given him some impression about our feeling and our unity about questions of Berlin and the like. I would think on that balance, as far as I can now judge, it has served a constructive purpose.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you gather from last week's conversation with Mr. Mikoyan that an impelling reason behind his visit and the last two notes was a fear of West German rearmament?*

A. It is very hard to judge what the purpose or purposes of his visit are. There may be, probably are, several purposes—not a single purpose. I do think that there is genuine and understandable concern on the part of the Soviet Union about the future of Germany. And there are two very basic philosophies on that subject: one that of the Soviet Union, one that of the Western powers. And it's very difficult to reconcile those two philosophies. I hope perhaps that in the further talks we have we can at least get to understand each other a little better on that subject.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, a moment ago when you were referring to the assumptions of the '55 Foreign Ministers meeting you spoke of German reunification without using the other part, the assumption of reunification on the basis of free elections. I ask about that especially since Mikoyan is quoted this morning as having said yesterday, "You're arming Germans with atomic weapons to be used against us, and you're demanding free elections. One is not compatible with the other." Is there any change in the free-elections part of that proposal, or is that something that is negotiable in terms of reunification, if that is attainable?*

A. We believe in reunification by free elections, which was indeed the formula that was agreed to at the summit conference in 1955.<sup>4</sup> It was agreed to by Khrushchev himself, who was of course a participant in that conference. There they spoke of the reunification of Germany by free elections consistent with the German national interests and European security. That is approximately the language of the agreement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has there been any hint dropped to you by Mr. Mikoyan or any other Soviets that the Russians would now like a new meeting between the President and Mr. Khrushchev?*

A. No. I have heard no suggestion to that effect.

#### **U.S. and Soviet Philosophies Regarding Germany**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what's your reaction—what's the United States reaction to the Soviet proposal of last weekend for a peace conference to draft a new peace treaty for Germany?*

A. That proposal highlights what I just referred to as the two different philosophies about dealing with Germany. The Soviet Union has consistently believed that Germany should be isolated, segregated, to a large extent demilitarized and neutralized, and separated from close association with the neighboring countries.

We don't believe that that is a sound approach to the problem. On the contrary, we take the view that Germany and the German people are too great, vigorous, and vital a people to be dealt with in that way and that that way is fraught with very great danger for the future. We be-

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176.

lieve that the future is best served by encouraging the closest possible relations between Germany and other Western European countries which are peace-loving and having such a close integration—military, political, economic—that independent, aggressive, nationalist action by Germany becomes as a practical matter impossible and also something that would not be desired.

Now, that has been the basic philosophy not only of this administration but of the preceding administration. It was reflected by the EDC (European Defense Community); and when the EDC proved impractical, the basic philosophy was carried forward in terms of the Brussels treaty for Western European union, the bringing of the Federal Republic into NATO—integration of its forces in that way—the further development of economic unity through adding to the Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market, EURATOM, and measures of that sort with their common assembly behind them. We believe that that is the proper way to deal with the German problem.

Now, as I say, that reflects a philosophy which is totally different from that of the Soviet Union. And the Soviet proposal of this peace treaty, which is similar to the proposals made in '52 and also again in '54, reflects the Soviet approach. As Adenauer said yesterday, it's a "brutal" approach. But it's in our opinion worse than a brutal approach; it's a stupid approach, because we don't think it will work. We believe the other approach is the sound one. Now, whether we can on that basis reach a meeting of minds with the Soviet Union, I don't know.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, pursuing that same subject, is the American position on the reunification of Germany by free elections totally incompatible with a peace treaty which would to a degree limit German rearmament and German participation in military pacts?*

A. We, of course, have in the Brussels treaty for European union very definite limitations on German armament which have been freely accepted, to some extent indeed proposed, by the Germans themselves—the Federal Republic of Germany. So that the concept of having limitations is not a concept which is in any way alien either to our thinking or to the thinking of the Federal Republic itself.

Now, you speak about military pacts. I don't think of these things as military pacts. I think of them as collective associations where people work together for peace and security, where they consult together, where they exchange views about their foreign policies, their political programs, and the like. The idea that these collective security associations are aggressive military alliances which are bad is a concept which we reject totally. We believe that this type of association of nations coming together for collective security is the modern way whereby the family of nations gets the same kind of association that you get within a community where people associate together for their security through common institutions.

*Q. So your answer to the second part of my question is yes it is incompatible with our stand?*

A. Well, I don't remember your question clearly enough to go back and say the answer to the question is "Yes." But I think the record will show whether or not my answer justifies that characterization.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your conversation with Mr. Mikoyan, was the subject of China mentioned at any stage?*

A. I don't recall that it was mentioned. It certainly did not assume any important role. It might possibly have been mentioned in a passing way but not sufficiently that it registered particularly in my mind at the present time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Mikoyan has been reported by several sources as having emphasized that the Soviet proposal to make West Berlin a free city should not be regarded as an ultimatum. Can you tell us whether this is so and whether at the same time the Soviets have indicated any willingness to stop their plan for turning over their zone to the East Berliners and the East Germans sometime in June?*

A. It has been made clear that there was no intention on the part of the Soviet Union to have their note treated as an ultimatum with a fixed time limit. And that is encouraging because, as the Western allies said in their note of the end of December, we would find it very difficult indeed to negotiate under that kind of an ultimatum. So to that extent some progress has been made.

I would not say that there has been any indication, as far as the substance of the matter is concerned, of any alteration in the Soviet position.

#### **New Government of Cuba**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has the United States asked the Cuban Government in any way or indicated in any way that they ought to discontinue the blood bath taking place in that country?*

A. I don't think we have made any representations on that subject.

*Q. Could you tell us what our position is regarding that?*

A. It is our hope of course that this new Government of Cuba will be responsive to the aspirations of the Cuban people for a government of freedom, liberty, justice, and law. We hope that its actions will conform to that ideal. The actual facts about what is taking place are not entirely clear or our information dependable at the present time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to the German question, in an effort to bring the two political philosophies together I believe at one time you undertook to reassure the Soviet Government that, if it accepted free elections in Germany, the West would guarantee that it would not seek to push its defense line farther to the east. Would you spell out that idea and indicate to us how this assurance would be made positive?*

A. That was part of the concept as I recall that was put forward in '55, although perhaps not as clearly or as dramatically as might have been done. In part it has been covered by my answer to a prior question where I said that I do not think that it is reasonable to expect that the Soviet Union will give up positions which it has if it thinks that by doing so it may be giving a strategic military advantage to those whom it regards—I think wrongly, but nevertheless which it regards—as potential enemies. We just can't expect that to happen. Therefore, if there is going to be any reunification of Germany, it has got to be under conditions which take into account realistically some of those very elemental, primitive facts of life. It was in order to meet that point of view that we tried to give reassur-

ances to the Soviet Union along those lines, and it is still my view that we should be prepared to do that.

*Q. In addition to that, would you recall for us what your position was on the proposal of Sir Anthony Eden at Geneva for the thinning out of troops and for some linking of the Warsaw with the NATO pact?*

A. I don't recall just what Sir Anthony Eden's proposals were in that respect. I think that we recognized that, if events should move along the lines of the reunification of Germany, under these conditions there would almost automatically come about a lessening of the military requirements in the Western area and a consequent reduction of forces there. As far as the linking of the pacts was concerned, I don't think that that was ever proposed. At least that is not my recollection. I think what was proposed was an overriding European security pact which would embrace perhaps the members of both NATO and the Warsaw pacts and which would contain assurances that, if any one of the group should take aggressive action against the other, all of the other members would unite to come to the defense of the victim of attack. That would be a sort of an overriding European security proposal which would be superimposed upon the Warsaw pact and the NATO powers.

*Q. What is your position on that at the present time?*

A. I still hold the view that that would be a sound way in which to proceed.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you be willing to have the present East Germany demilitarized as part of such a settlement with Russia if they agreed to a reunification? In other words, keep East or West German troops out of that part of the country?*

A. Well, something along that line is implicit in the suggestion that has been made. Of course, you have got to have ordinary police forces, forces to maintain law and order and internal security. But the proposal that was made earlier and which has been discussed here already did imply that the military position of the Western powers, NATO, should not be pushed forward into East Germany if there should be reunification.



*Q. Mr. Secretary, if you say you are not negotiating bilaterally with Mr. Mikoyan during this visit, how do you propose to negotiate all these aspects of the German question that we have been discussing, or in fact do you propose to negotiate them?*

A. Well, we have made a proposal to negotiate on the question of the reunification of Germany, Berlin, and European security. That proposal was made in our December 31st note. The Soviets have said that they are prepared to negotiate on the question of Berlin and on the question of a German peace treaty but not on the question of German reunification or at the same time on the question of European security.

Now there seems to be one common denominator which runs through all this, which is, there seems to be a desire on both sides to get together and talk. There is not a meeting of minds as to what we talk about. There seems to be a sharp difference of opinion as to what we talk about, but there is at least a common denominator, I think, in terms of a feeling that there should be discussions. You might say that it has gotten down to the point where it is a matter of agenda. We know that the question of agenda can be a very serious stumbling block in the way of meetings. It was so at the time of the Palais Rose conference (Paris session of deputies of Council of Foreign Ministers, March 5-June 21, 1951), and it has been a stumbling block in the way of a summit meeting.

*Q. But in Berlin in 1954 you accepted the Soviet agenda at the outset. It really made no difference in the substance of the talks. In this case would you be willing to accept perhaps the single word "Germany" as an agenda?*

A. I think that our ideas as to the possible subject of discussion are broad. It is the Soviet Union that is trying to narrow the subject of discussion. We would not be alarmed by the broadness of the agenda. The only thing that alarms us would be the narrowness of the agenda and to have a meeting which tried to deal with the question of a peace treaty and Berlin without being able at the same time even to discuss the question of the reunification of Germany or the question of European security. That seems to us unrealistic. It was recognized in the Geneva summit meeting directive that there was a close

interrelationship between the question of Germany and European security. We still believe that there is that interrelationship. So what concerns us would be not the broadening of the agenda but being debarred from discussing what we considered to be vital things by a narrowing of the agenda before the talks start.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Mikoyan seems to have struck on a formula for achieving personal talks with American leaders by a personal call on the Ambassador here. What would your reaction be to an application by Mr. Khrushchev to call on his Ambassador here and possibly have the same round of talks?*

A. I doubt whether it would be possible for the Prime Minister to come here in the same atmosphere of informality that attended the visit of Mr. Mikoyan. I would just like to recall, however, that the President in his letter to the then Premier Bulganin, I think early last year, did invite the coming to this country of important persons in the Soviet Union.<sup>\*</sup> But I think also he made clear that that did not comprehend anybody so important as Mr. Khrushchev. (Laughter)

#### **Visit of Argentine President**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what you expect will be accomplished during the forthcoming visit of the Argentine President to Washington?*

A. We believe that this visit will serve to consolidate the good relations between our two countries. The Argentine has always been one of the very important members of the Organization of American States. There are very important interests that we have in common. We are encouraged by what seems to us to be a sound approach to many problems being taken by President [Arturo] Frondizi. As you know, there has been a very considerable amount of economic assistance extended in that connection by various banking institutions. We have no specific objective in mind in connection with this talk. We do think that an exchange of views about general matters will be in our mutual interests. We look forward to it very much.

<sup>\*</sup> For an exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin, see *ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1958, p. 373.



*Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you a question about your health, if I may. Can you tell us how you are feeling now and, especially, whether or not you feel capable to carry on your present job in view of the fact that it looks like we are going into a very active period of diplomatic negotiations?*

*A. Well, I am feeling good. I feel able to carry on. At any time I don't feel able to carry on, you will know it.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is it our position that free elections are the only method of reuniting Germany? In other words, do we say, "No free elections, no reunification"?*

*A. Well, we never have said that. The formula of reunification by free elections was the agreed formula. It seems to us to be a natural method. But I wouldn't say that it is the only method by which reunification could be accomplished.*

#### **Geneva Talks on Nuclear Test Suspension**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the question of the atomic-test negotiations in Geneva, in view of the new scientific findings as released by the White House recently,<sup>6</sup> is it now the position of this Government that you would not sign a test suspension or stoppage based exclusively on the findings of the experts, the agreed findings of the experts at Geneva last summer?<sup>7</sup>*

*A. It is a bit too early yet to evaluate that information in terms of what may be the techniques available for detection. I think that that information gained from our recent experiments indicated that the techniques which had originally been contemplated were perhaps inadequate. But very careful studies are being made to see whether there cannot be found ways of detection which can really be brought within the compass of the original report of the experts, so that no serious or revolutionary change would be required.*

*Q. Well, Mr. Secretary, are we also giving consideration to what appears to be the alternative if such technical means cannot be found; that is, to establish a threshold below which explosions*

*underground, which would presumably not contaminate the air, would be permitted in the so-called smaller sized weapons?*

*A. That is a possible fallback position which has been considered. It was a position, you may recall, which was presented by Senator Gore when he came back from the discussions. But we see no reason at the moment to come to that position, because, as I say, we haven't gotten down yet to the details of a control system and as to what would be acceptable, what would be practical. Now if it turns out that what is acceptable or what is practical leaves an area where there could be undetected underground explosions, then at that point we would have to consider, I think, this alternative.*

#### **Question of Free Elections**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to clarify an earlier answer that you made, you said that "free elections are the natural method for unifying Germany, but it is not the only method." Could you tell us what other methods there might be which could be acceptable to us and the West Germans and our allies?*

*A. No, I wouldn't want to speculate about that. There are all kinds of methods whereby countries and peoples draw together, and I merely said that I did not feel that we should treat any one method as an absolutely exclusive one.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when you said that the Soviet plan for Germany is "stupid" because it wouldn't work, in what sense did you mean it wouldn't work? What bad result did you see flowing from it?*

*A. I believe that, if you try to isolate and segregate a great people like the Germans in the center of Europe, they will become a restive and dangerous force; they will attempt to gain advantages to themselves by trying to play off the East against the West. I don't think that you can put the Germans within the kind of a smothering blanket that the Soviet Union has in mind and expect that that will hold. That, in a way, was the approach of the Treaty of Versailles, and it just didn't work. And I don't think it will work again. I think that a so-called neutralized and largely demilitarized Germany, attempted to be demilitarized in the middle of*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 26, 1959, p. 118.

<sup>7</sup> For a statement by James B. Fisk, chairman of the Western panel of experts, and texts of a final communique and report, see *ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 452.

Europe, is just something that won't work and that, instead of trying to isolate Germany, the best way is to tie Germany in.

Now that is the basic thesis of Adenauer. I believe that Adenauer's claim to greatness rests upon his effort to assure that Germany will not again follow the path which Germany followed in 1914 and again in 1939. He is the one who has invented, you might say, this solution. And I believe it is the most practical and sound solution for those who really want to end for all time the kind of danger that has come from Germany in the past.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the suspension you mentioned a moment ago that there had not been time yet to evaluate some of the technicalities of detection and other aspects. If this is true and if the results will have a very direct bearing on whatever agreement, if any, is reached, why are we negotiating until those technical subjects are answered? Doesn't it, rightly or wrongly, put us in a position of seeming to be hypocritical on the matter?*

A. I don't think so. The studies are going on at a very active rate by our own scientists, and it may very well be that they will find that, while there are means of explosion of a character not heretofore adequately evaluated, there are also ways whereby these control posts that were recommended by the experts can cope with the problem.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in this connection, what is your feeling about the inclusion of China in any disarmament agreement or test agreement on nuclear suspension?*

A. I take it you are referring to Communist China, or the Republic of China?

*Q. Communist China. (Laughter)*

A. Well, I have said before that ultimately I think that a system of detection should be geographically worldwide in its scope. But there is no present effort to make it so, and it is more or less agreed that for the purpose of the present negotiations the inspection at this stage will be limited to areas controlled by the three powers now possessing nuclear weapons.

*Q. Thank you, sir.*

## **United States Explains Policy Toward Cuba**

### *Department Statement*

Press release 35 dated January 15

Recent statements in the Cuban and American press critical of United States policy in Cuba and of Ambassador [Earl E. T.] Smith reflect a widespread lack of understanding of what United States policy toward Cuba has been.

The policy of the United States with respect to the Cuban revolution has been strictly one of non-intervention in Cuban domestic affairs, and the Ambassador's role has conformed always to this policy. Much as the American people, being free themselves, would have liked to have seen a free democratic system in Cuba, the United States Government was pledged in agreements with its sister republics to a course of nonintervention. Like all the other American Republics, the United States maintained normal diplomatic relations with the Batista government. Under established inter-American policy this did not imply judgment in favor of the domestic policy of that government or against the revolutionary forces. From the time when it became evident that Cuba was undergoing a revolution which had the support of a large segment of the population, the United States demonstrated its determination to avoid all possible involvement in Cuba's internal conflict by suspending all sales and shipments of combat arms to the Batista government. This action coincided with the renewed suspension of constitutional guaranties by the Batista government following a 46-day period during which the suspension had been lifted following the appeal of the United States Government through its Ambassador.

The United States military missions to Cuba were established in 1950 and '51 pursuant to agreements between the United States and Cuba, negotiated with the Prio government. These agreements had as their sole purpose cooperation in the common defense of Cuba and the United States, and of the hemisphere as a whole. The function of the missions was to lend technical advice, facilitate access to United States technical military experience, arrange for the admissions of Cubans to United States service schools and academies, and facilitate the procurement of equip-

ment and arms as recommended by the missions for common defense as described above. Similar United States missions are maintained in 19 of the other American Republics. In utilizing for the purpose of putting down the Cuban revolution any part of the equipment that had been provided under the agreement prior to the arms suspension or the small unit that had been previously trained and constituted expressly for the common defense, the government of Batista acted in disregard of the agreement and over the reiterated objections of the United States. No napalm was sold or otherwise provided by the United States for use against the Cuban revolutionaries. Eight napalm bombs were sold in 1955 for demonstration purposes. This sale was approved prior to the existence of the recent revolution in Cuba. By agreement between the Departments of State and Defense, none has been supplied to Cuba since. As for the missions themselves, they had no contact whatever with any military operations against the revolutionaries. They trained no personnel for this purpose. No mission personnel were present at any time in the zones of operation. Therefore, the charge that the United States supplied arms for Batista's operations against the rebels or that the missions assisted these operations in any way is completely false.

### **President Eisenhower Congratulates General de Gaulle**

White House press release dated January 9

*The White House on January 9 made public the following message from President Eisenhower to Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Republic.*

JANUARY 8, 1959

DEAR GENERAL DE GAULLE: At this historic moment I deem it a privilege and honor to extend to you greetings and congratulations upon your inauguration as the first President of the Fifth French Republic.

France has a special place in the hearts of the American people. Moreover, you yourself have come to symbolize for us not only French valor and resolution in the face of adversity but also a dynamic and youthful France determined to go forward with renewed vigor and faith. For these

reasons the American people join me in saluting the beginning of the Fifth Republic with great hope and confidence. We send to you and to the noble people you have the honor to lead a special message of friendship and of good wishes for your own future and that of the French nation.

The traditional friendship between our two peoples and our two Governments is firmly established in our foreign relations. I believe, however, that this is a most fitting occasion for us to rededicate ourselves to strengthening these ties and to build an ever more intimate and understanding partnership.

Please accept, Mr. President, my best wishes and the assurances of my highest esteem.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

His Excellency

General CHARLES DE GAULLE  
*President of the French Republic  
Paris, France*

### **U.S. Asks U.S.S.R. To Review Basis for Talks on Surprise Attack**

Press release 36 dated January 16

*Following is the text of a note delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 15, 1959, concerning the problem of minimizing the possibility of surprise attack.*

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor in behalf of the governments of the five countries from which the Western experts were drawn to refer to the report<sup>1</sup> of the conference of experts to study possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack, which by agreement suspended its meetings on December 18, 1958<sup>2</sup> in view of the Christmas and New Year's holidays and in order to report to governments on its work.

While the meetings of this conference were helpful in clarifying for each side the views of

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/4078.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1959, p. 13.



the other side, it is a source of deep regret to the United States that more substantive progress was not made in joint technical-military analysis of the problem of minimizing the possibility of surprise attack.

For their part, the Western experts at the conference suggested a plan of work designed to facilitate a logical technical-military analysis of the problem by assembling the facts necessary for evaluating the effectiveness of various systems of inspection and observation. To facilitate the discussions the Western experts presented technical papers on the significant instruments of surprise attack, and on the techniques which would be effective in observation and inspection of such weapons. The Western experts also presented technical papers on illustrative systems of observation and inspection for certain instruments of surprise attack, as well as a technical analysis of the value of warning systems and of factors to be considered in the integration of such systems.

The experts from the other side refused to join the Western experts in a technical-military analysis of measures of observation and inspection which would minimize the possibility of surprise attack except within the context of political proposals considered by the Western experts to be beyond the competence of the experts conference. It was thus not possible to conduct a joint analysis of the type of measures most likely to bring the greatest amount of security against surprise attack and of the nature and value of various possible preliminary measures which governments might wish to institute.

It thus became apparent that the experts from the two sides were operating under two different terms of reference and that this difference was preventing the type of joint technical analysis that would give real meaning to the discussions.

It also became clear that future discussions of the surprise attack problem could not be productive until governments had resolved these differences. Referring to the Soviet Government's note of January 10,<sup>3</sup> the Government of the United States, for the reasons cited above, does not believe it useful or desirable to set a date of January 15 for reconvening the conference. The Govern-

ment of the United States will continue to consult on this subject with the other governments to which the Soviet Government's note has been addressed.

The United States believes that the problem of reducing the danger of surprise attack is so important that renewed efforts must be made. The United States Government, therefore, is giving high priority to continued study of this problem, and is carefully studying the record of the conference in order to determine whether the terms of reference for future discussions can usefully be clarified. Thereafter further reviews of this question will be transmitted to the Soviet Union.

The United States Government has reason to believe that the governments of the other four countries from which the Western experts were drawn are also studying the record of the conference for the same purpose.

It is hoped that the Soviet Union will also carefully review the records of the conference and study means of resolving the present differences and of reaching an agreed basis for early and fruitful resumption of discussions of the surprise attack problem.

## **United States Sends 50,000 Tons of Wheat to Afghanistan**

Press release 27 dated January 12

The Department of State announced on January 12 that at the request of the Government of Afghanistan the United States will send up to 50,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan to avert a food-grain shortage which is developing in this South Asian country due to recent severe crop losses there.

The wheat, which will come from stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation, will be provided to Afghanistan on a grant basis through the facilities of the International Cooperation Administration and its Operations Mission in Afghanistan. The U.S. market value of the shipments, including ocean freight, will total approximately \$4 million.

The Government of Afghanistan will distribute the grain in Afghanistan. In order that maximum benefits may be derived from the shipments, Afghanistan is expected to deposit local-currency proceeds derived from the grain into a special account. These funds will be used to help finance

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.



development projects in Afghanistan mutually agreed upon by the United States and the Afghan Government.

Arrangements have already been initiated to get the shipments under way in the earliest possible time.

This is the third successive year that the United States has responded to requests from Afghanistan for relief from crop shortages which have plagued the country during the past several years because of adverse weather conditions.

A total of 40,000 tons of wheat were delivered to Afghanistan during 1958 on a grant basis, and 40,000 tons were provided to that country in late 1956 for delivery from November 1956 through June 1957.

As in the present case the grain was provided under provisions of title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480), which authorizes the use of U.S. farm surpluses for emergency relief purposes in the United States and abroad.

## Imperatives of International Economic Growth

*by Under Secretary Dillon<sup>1</sup>*

We have recently entered what promises to be a year of the highest drama. This fateful year is certain to produce formidable challenges to us as a nation, as a God-fearing people, and as freedom-loving citizens. Inevitably many of 1959's problems will stem from the aggressive, expansionist ambitions of the leaders of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

There is no need for me to spell out here the full dimensions of international communism's military, economic, and psychological threat to the free world. Many of you were among the first to recognize its total nature and its enormous implications for our way of life. And you, and the organizations you represent, were among the first to call for a many-sided response to this many-sided challenge—a response which your Government is pressing forward on every front.

As you well know, Communist efforts in the economic field have been intensified in recent years. But I do not intend today to discuss the Sino-Soviet economic offensive. I want instead to examine with you the demand being made upon our resources and upon our consciences to help raise the living standards of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These are

the areas where most of mankind lives and where the struggle between freedom and totalitarianism may ultimately be decided. The need to help these peoples forward on the road to economic progress would confront us even if communism and the Sino-Soviet bloc simply didn't exist.

To me, the yearning of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America for a better way of life presents us with the ultimate challenge of our times—and our greatest hope for the future. It is clearly a moral challenge. If we fail to respond adequately, we shall stand accused as a people who proclaim our own satisfaction with the benefits of freedom but who are slothful in carrying the spirit of freedom to others around the world. The plain fact is that our posture before the world can be no better than the manner in which we fulfill the obligations that flow from our status as the most materially favored nation in all history.

### Economic Imperatives for Developed Countries

Our objective must be to help raise other peoples' standards of living. In so doing we shall also help to raise standards of personal and political freedom—a goal which is impossible of achievement in the absence of economic growth. With these objectives in mind let us consider the imperatives of international economic development.

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Foundation for Religious Action in the Social and Civil Order at Washington, D.C., on Jan. 16 (press release 37).

The first imperative—and a major one—is to maintain a sturdy, growing economy in the United States. Our ability to extend aid, to offer the capital which is so badly needed in the newly emerging countries, is conditioned upon our domestic strength. Our prosperity also helps to assure them a market for their output. The movement of goods is, of course, closely related to the movement of capital. Not only must we import in order to export. We must import to keep investment flowing overseas. For, without the prospect of returns, the expanding flow of private investment is impossible.

The second imperative—and one with which we must reckon increasingly as we continue to prosper—is the need to narrow the widening gap between living standards in the industrialized West and the underdeveloped nations. Ironically, while our own living standards and those of our allies in Europe are rapidly improving, living standards in the newly emerging nations are advancing much more slowly—due largely to the tremendous growth in population. Heroic efforts to narrow this gap must be made this year, not a decade hence, when it will be too late. We can be thankful that we are not alone in our recognition of this imperative. As they have emerged from the devastation of war, Britain, France, and Italy have been turning their attention increasingly to assisting the world's underdeveloped areas. Germany has recently entered this field with characteristic vigor, as have our neighbor, Canada, and other members of the British Commonwealth. So has Japan. The Japanese are now beginning to share their skills and resources with their neighbors.

But this gap cannot be closed by our efforts alone, nor even by the combined efforts of ourselves and our allies. The peoples of the newly emerging nations must make the major contribution to their own progress. I have visited many of these countries and talked to their leaders. A fresh wind is sweeping through them. Their peoples are no longer content to sit back and envy the more developed countries. They have been caught up in what has been aptly described as the revolution of rising expectations. Their leaders are desperately trying to meet these expectations. They need our help in their great effort.

Military security and internal stability must be

present to provide the framework in which economic progress can take place at a steady and acceptable rate. Many of the newly emerging nations, especially in Asia and Africa, are plagued by the tensions inherent in the transition to new-found political independence. Our mutual security program has been of assistance in this respect by making available equipment, training, and defense support for indigenous military and civil forces.

A third imperative is the maintenance of adequate markets on which the developing countries can place their goods. These countries must sell their products in order to obtain the industrial equipment needed for development. We have made significant strides toward keeping our market open to the surplus production of all countries of the free world through the extension of our Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act on a realistic, long-term basis. We are also working with other countries to expand trade through the operations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. We must continue to pursue ways to remove artificial restraints upon world trade—our own and those imposed by others. Since many of the less developed countries now find their exports concentrated in a few primary commodities, we must stand ready to study ways to help avoid disastrous price fluctuations and to assist them in diversifying their economies.

#### **Need for Technical and Managerial Skills**

A fourth requirement for the newly emerging nations is the crying need for the technical and managerial skills which are the bedrock of development. Without them no amount of capital will bring about growth. The United States has, over a period of years, made important contributions in this area: bilaterally, through our International Cooperation Administration and, multilaterally, through the United Nations and the Organization of American States. The need for technical skills is fully recognized by the developing nations themselves. For example, the recent annual report of the Colombo Plan's Consultative Committee, said:<sup>2</sup>

In a year which has seen intensive consideration given to increasing the capital resources of leading lending institutions, it is now urgent that the less developed

<sup>2</sup> For an extract from the annual report, see *BULLETIN* of Dec. 1, 1958, p. 853.

countries give greater attention to the development of the human skills which can assure the appropriate and effective utilization of these capital resources.

A fifth necessity is private investment. If we are to be of maximum help to less developed countries, our private resources—which are far larger than those Government can possibly provide—must be welcomed and drawn upon to the greatest extent possible. We are constantly seeking ways to stimulate the flow of private American investment abroad. The investment guaranty program of the ICA has been steadily expanding. Through tax treaties, through our system of credit for foreign income taxes paid, and through other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, the United States is endeavoring to avoid double taxation and thus facilitate American investment abroad. In our current tax-treaty negotiations we have introduced an important innovation. We are preparing to give tax credit for certain income taxes waived by less developed countries as an inducement to investment, as if they had, in fact, been collected abroad. Currently we are studying ways to ascertain how the Government can more effectively enlist the aid of private enterprise in achieving the objectives of our foreign policy. A group of distinguished citizens drawn from the Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce is now working actively on the preparation of concrete suggestions, and the President has stated his intention of submitting legislation on this subject to the Congress.

A sixth requirement is for public loans on normal bankable terms. Such loans are now being extended by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund. These organizations have a special virtue, for they draw on both the public and private resources of the entire free world. The United States has believed in, contributed to, and supported these agencies from the very beginning. The directors of these institutions, acting upon an American suggestion, have proposed to expand their resources.<sup>3</sup> The United States also extends bankable loans for development through the Export-Import Bank, which has made an outstanding contribution to economic progress.

A seventh requirement is for development financing which will provide flexible terms of repay-

ment. Many sound projects which are essential to development cannot qualify for bankable loans. It was to help finance such projects on a business-like basis that the United States Congress established the Development Loan Fund. It works closely with our Export-Import Bank and with the World Bank to stimulate an increased flow of bankable loans for development programs. One of its objectives is to help stimulate private enterprise, which is so essential to the stability of the less developed areas. In its first year of operation it has proved itself as a highly effective tool for economic development. It deserves your full and active support.

The United States is also working with its sister republics of the other Americas toward the establishment of an inter-American financial institution. And we are suggesting the establishment of an International Development Association closely affiliated with the International Bank. Such an association would be a multilateral version of our own Development Loan Fund. It would provide a means whereby other countries able to do so could join in financing development projects. We are now actively examining the feasibility of such an institution with our friends and allies. This proposal, as many of you know, sprang originally from an imaginative concept of Senator Monroney, who has long been a leader in our nation's efforts to aid the newly emerging peoples.

#### **Economic Imperatives for Underdeveloped Countries**

Now I have been discussing the imperatives which depend heavily upon the initiative and the resources of the more developed nations. There are other imperatives of economic development which rest largely with the peoples of the underdeveloped nations themselves. I shall mention them briefly:

1. The need to create a climate in which foreign private investment can flourish;
2. The need to stimulate national savings so as to accumulate the domestic capital which is needed to insure stability and economic progress;
3. A willingness on the part of indigenous capital and business to welcome competition and assume risks normal to healthy free enterprise;
4. The reduction of traditional social and cultural barriers to economic progress, whether based upon class, race, or tradition;

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1958, p. 793.



5. The need to emphasize scientific, technical, financial, and commercial studies in their educational systems—plus a willingness on the part of the more talented individuals to seek training in skills directly related to economic progress rather than to pursue education primarily as a means of enhancing social prestige.

These needs are rooted in problems based on attitudes, tradition, and established social patterns. They are resistant to change. They will not all be met tomorrow. But they must eventually be met if the newly emerging peoples are to make a successful transition to a state of steady economic growth.

#### **Redefining Our National Purpose**

Finally I come to an imperative which is of crucial importance to this nation. I refer to the need for redefining our national purpose in extending aid to other countries of the free world.

I sometimes wonder if we haven't fallen into a trap of our own making when, in seeking support for our mutual security program, we present it to the American people mainly as an answer to the menace of Communist aggression. We find that our motives are sometimes misunderstood abroad. I wonder if we haven't allowed ourselves to be identified in the eyes of large parts of the world as defenders of our own *status quo*, rather than as a people whose motivations are founded upon principle and whose response to the needs of others arises out of a deep sense of moral responsibility.

We must clearly establish the fact that all of our endeavors in the foreign aid field are designed as part of one common free-world enterprise. We must consolidate a communion of interest with the aspiring peoples. I know of only one way to shape an image of integrity and responsibility. That is to exhibit integrity and responsibility. This we have most assuredly done. But perhaps we have allowed our good deeds to be obscured in

the fog generated by our problems with the Soviet Union.

I neither overlook nor minimize the dangers to this country inherent in masses of men and weapons, as well as technical and industrial resources, in the hands of an implacable Communist enemy. Without question, economic and technical assistance to the newly developing nations is in our national self-interest. However, we do ourselves a grave injustice and distort our true image before the world if we give our foreign aid program a wholly selfish cast. For this program rests squarely in the great tradition of idealism that has motivated the American people since our earliest beginnings.

The Marshall plan, the point 4 program, and the present mutual security program have no parallel in all history. The willing acceptance by the American people of the challenge to help free other peoples from the bitter slavery of poverty is one of the greatest moral achievements of this century. We should not permit it to be derided by the cynical or deprecated by the uninformed.

I look to groups such as this to help bring about a wider understanding of the imperatives of our foreign policies, both at home and abroad. That understanding is crucially needed. For our foreign aid programs grew naturally out of our social, cultural, and religious heritage. We have accepted a great challenge from which we cannot draw back. If we answer it successfully we shall be assured a place in history as one of the great humanitarian peoples of all times. In the words of Arnold Toynbee:

Our age will be well remembered, not for its horrifying crimes or its astonishing inventions, but because it is the first generation since the dawn of history in which mankind dared to believe it practical to make the benefits of civilization available to the whole human race.

We are the natural leaders of that generation. Our duty and our path are clear.



## Progress in Promoting Peace and Stability in the Middle East

### THIRD REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ACTIVITIES UNDER THE JOINT RESOLUTION TO PROMOTE PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST<sup>1</sup>

#### PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

*To the Congress of the United States:*

I am transmitting herewith the third report to the Congress covering activities through June 30, 1958, in furtherance of the purposes of the joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East. This report supplements the first and second reports forwarded to the Congress on July 31, 1957,<sup>2</sup> and March 5, 1958.<sup>3</sup>

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 9, 1958.

#### TEXT OF REPORT

##### CHAPTER 1

##### Progress in Furtherance of the Resolution

JANUARY 1 TO JUNE 30, 1958

House Joint Resolution 117,<sup>4</sup> to promote peace and stability in the Middle East, was approved by the President on March 9, 1957. When adopted, it established a milestone in U.S. policy for the area. It is no less important today to U.S. interests. The policy enunciated in the resolution continues to be a most significant and vital element of our foreign policy.

The resolution sets forth in unmistakable terms the importance which the United States attaches to the preservation of the integrity and independence of the Middle East nations. The resolution also authorizes assistance in building economic

strength and military security dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. It states, in addition, that if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism. It is especially noteworthy that it offers our cooperation only to those nations which desire such cooperation. Thus, the resolution accomplishes two objectives: (1) it assures these nations of our support for their independence and integrity, if they desire our support, and (2) it leaves no possibility of miscalculation on the part of Communist or Communist-controlled aggressors of our intention in case of an armed attack on these nations.

The Middle East is an area in which the understandable desires of the peoples for improvement in their lot and for fulfillment of their national aspirations cannot be suppressed. Yet, these very desires and aspirations lead to tensions which are exploited by external disruptive forces.

The policies set forth in the resolution have been under constant attack by the forces which they are intended to restrain. From the time the resolution was originally presented to the Congress by the President on January 5, 1957, the Soviet Union has used every means at its disposal to distort the purposes of the United States in the minds of the peoples of the area. During the period under review that attack continued unabated.

Yet the steadfastness of purpose embodied in the resolution heartened those who wished our cooperation in maintaining their strength and integrity. On January 27, 1958, Secretary of State Dulles, speaking to the fourth session of the Min-

<sup>1</sup> H. Doc. 43, 86th Cong., 1st sess.; transmitted on Sept. 9, 1958.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 26, 1957, p. 339.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1958, p. 524.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1957, p. 481.

isterial Council of the Baghdad Pact in Ankara said:<sup>\*</sup>

The purposes of the United States in the Middle East have been spelled out clearly in the joint congressional resolution on the Middle East which was adopted last year. The goal, as there expressed, is "the maintenance of national independence" of the nations of the Middle East.

We are well aware of the fact that in this general area political independence, always an aspiration, has sometimes been lost and oftentimes been threatened, as indeed it is threatened today.

Also we recognize that it is not enough merely to want, or now to have independence. Reliable independence rests on two pillars: the pillar of defensive security and the pillar of economic health. The United States is prepared to cooperate, where desired, in assisting in these two ways any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East to maintain national independence.

The independence of nations in the area continues to be threatened. During May and June of this year that fact was made clear in Lebanon, where purely internal problems were exploited by external forces seeking to destroy that nation's stability and integrity.

These countries need assurances that the United States will cooperate with them. We must continue to assist those desiring our cooperation in building economic health and defensive security to maintain national independence. We must utilize all the means at our disposal—diplomacy, aid, military strength, the dissemination of undistorted information—to achieve that objective. These means, within the policy enunciated in the resolution, give encouragement that the U.S. goal of promoting peace and stability in the Middle East can be achieved.

#### CHAPTER 2

##### Economic and Military Assistance

The President was authorized by the resolution to cooperate with nations in the area in develop-

<sup>\*</sup> For statements by Secretary Dulles and text of the final communique, see *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1958, p. 250.

ing economic strength and security through economic and military assistance programs. Section 3 of the resolution provided for special authority in the use of fiscal year 1957 mutual security funds for these purposes.

During the first half of 1958 action was taken toward completing economic and military assistance commitments made during fiscal year 1957 pursuant to section 3 of the resolution. In addition, the regular authorities of the Mutual Security Act and funds appropriated for fiscal year 1958 were used to further the purposes of sections 1 and 2. Thus, we were able to continue to extend cooperation to those nations which desired such assistance in achieving the objectives of the resolution. Such tangible evidence of support not only helped to build the strength of the countries affected to resist threats, but it demonstrated, as well, to them and to the world our determination and seriousness of purpose.

#### CHAPTER 3

##### Action Pursuant to Section 4 of the Resolution

Section 4 of the resolution provides that the President shall continue to furnish facilities and military assistance to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East. The United States continues to support this activity, believing that the force is making a major contribution to the cause of peace in the area. On April 17, 1958, the United States transmitted to the Secretary-General a check in the amount of \$9,690,563 for this purpose, representing an additional U.S. assessment of \$1,563,063 for the year 1957 and the assessment of \$8,127,500 for the calendar year 1958.

In addition, since the establishment of the UNEF, the United States has made available to the force on a reimbursable basis supplies and equipment valued in excess of \$5 million. To date, the United Nations has compensated the United States for this material to the amount of approximately \$3 million.

# INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

## Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings<sup>1</sup>

### Adjourned During January 1959

U.N. Economic Commission for Africa: 1st Session . . . . .	Addis Ababa . . . . .	Dec. 29-Jan. 10
IMCO Preparatory Committee: 4th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Jan. 5-19
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: Intraregional Trade Promotion Talks.	Bangkok . . . . .	Jan. 5-16
U.N. Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: 11th Session.	New York. . . . .	Jan. 5-23
IMCO Assembly: 1st Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Jan. 6-23
IMCO Council: 1st Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Jan. 6-23
IAEA Board of Governors: 10th Session . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	Jan. 7-19
5th Pan American Consultation on Geography . . . . .	Quito. . . . .	Jan. 7-15
Telecommunication Experts in Radio—United States, United Kingdom, and Canada: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting.	London . . . . .	Jan. 10-20
ICAO: 2d Special Meeting on North Atlantic Fixed Services. . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Jan. 12-22
WHO Standing Committee on Administration and Finance . . . . .	Geneva. . . . .	Jan. 13-20
FAO Council: Special Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Jan. 15 (1 day)
4th Pan American Consultation on History. . . . .	Cuenca, Ecuador. . . . .	Jan. 19-27
WHO Executive Board: 23d Session . . . . .	Geneva. . . . .	Jan. 20-30
Baghdad Pact: 6th Meeting of the Ministerial Council . . . . .	Karachi. . . . .	Jan. 26-27
Executive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 1st Session.	Geneva. . . . .	Jan. 26-30

### In Session as of January 31, 1959

Political Discussions on Suspension of Nuclear Tests . . . . .	Geneva. . . . .	Oct. 31-
ICAO Middle East-Southeast Asia Regional Air Navigation Meeting.	Rome. . . . .	Jan. 7-
U.N. ECAFE Committee on Trade: 2d Session . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Jan. 23-
ILO Committee of Social Security Experts. . . . .	Geneva. . . . .	Jan. 26-
U.N. Wheat Conference: Negotiating Meeting . . . . .	Geneva. . . . .	Jan. 26-
International Rubber Study Group: Management Committee. . . . .	London . . . . .	Jan. 29-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 23d Session . . . . .	New York. . . . .	Jan. 30-

### Scheduled February 1 Through April 30, 1959

U.N. ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 11th Session.	Bangkok . . . . .	Feb. 4-
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Annual Meeting . . . . .	San Pedro, Calif.. . . . .	Feb. 6-
U.N. Population Commission: 10th Session . . . . .	Geneva. . . . .	Feb. 9-
ICAO: Special Meeting on Short-Range Navigational Aids . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Feb. 10-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 3d Meeting of Consultative Subcommittee on Rice.	Ceylon . . . . .	Feb. 16-
South Pacific Commission: Rhinoceros Beetle Technical Advisory Committee.	Suva, Fiji. . . . .	Feb. 16-
U.N. General Assembly: 13th Session (resumed) . . . . .	New York. . . . .	Feb. 20-
ILO Governing Body: 141st Session (and committees). . . . .	Geneva. . . . .	Feb. 23-
International Bureau of Education: Executive Committee . . . . .	Geneva. . . . .	February
3d European Civil Aviation Conference . . . . .	Strasbourg . . . . .	Mar. 9-
U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: . . . . . 15th Session	Broadbeach, Queensland, Australia. . . . .	Mar. 9-
U.N. International Commission on Commodity Trade: 7th Session.	New York. . . . .	Mar. 9-
U.N. Commission on the Status of Women: 13th Session. . . . .	New York. . . . .	Mar. 9-
U.N. ECE Road Transport Subcommittee: Working Party on Construction of Vehicles.	Geneva. . . . .	Mar. 16-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Jan. 14, 1959. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR, Comité consultatif internationale des radio communications; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; TAA, Technical Assistance Administration; U.N., United Nations; WHO, World Health Organization.

## Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

### Scheduled February 1 Through April 30, 1959—Continued

U.N. Commission on Human Rights: 15th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 16-
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on Gas Problems: 5th Session .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 25-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Telecommunications . . . . .	Tokyo . . . . .	Mar. 30-
ICAO Panel for Coordinating Procedures Respecting the Supply of Information for Air Operations . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	March
FAO Cocoa Study Group: Executive Committee . . . . .	Roma . . . . .	March
FAO/ECAFE Technical Meeting on Agricultural Marketing . . .	undetermined . . . . .	March
IA-NECOSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Montevideo . . . . .	March
Interparliamentary Council: 84th Meeting . . . . .	Nice . . . . .	Apr. 1-
World Meteorological Organization: 3d Congress . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 1-
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): 9th Plenary Assembly . . . . .	Los Angeles . . . . .	Apr. 1-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 27th Session . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	Apr. 7-
ILO Meeting To Establish an Individual Control Book for Drivers and Assistants in Road Transport . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 20-
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 14th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 20-
ILO Coal Mines Committee: 7th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 27-
U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 14th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 27-
U.N. Social Commission: 12th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 27-
ICAO Aeronautical Information Services Division/Aeronautical Maps and Charts Division . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Apr. 28-
FAO Governmental Experts on Use of Designations, Definitions, and Standards for Milk and Milk Products: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	April
U.N. ECAFE Working Group of Experts on Development Programming . . . . .	undetermined . . . . .	April
U.N. ECAFE/TAA Regional Seminar on Trade Promotion . . . .	Tokyo . . . . .	April

## The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination

*Following are statements made by Watson W. Wise and Mrs. Oswald B. Lord, U.S. Representatives to the U.N. General Assembly.*

### STATEMENT BY MR. WISE<sup>1</sup>

In the many debates which take place in this committee, sometimes one tends to forget that areas can be found in which unanimity exists. Such an area is the importance which we all attach to the issue of self-determination. My country is no exception. We are ever mindful of our colonial origin and of the fact that we had to take up arms to achieve our independence. We are ever mindful, too, that since the beginning of our history as a nation we have endeavored to demonstrate our sin-

cere attachment to the principle of self-determination. The revolt of the English colonies in North America has been defined, in fact, as the first assertion of the right of national and democratic self-determination in the history of the world. How then can we deny or disregard in our relations with other peoples a principle on which our nation has been founded? The point is, Madam Chairman, that we cannot and we do not.

Since the formation of our country our statesmen have rigidly adhered to the basic principles of self-determination. To cite only a few striking examples, President George Washington himself stated clearly in 1796 that his best wishes were irresistibly excited whenever, in any country, he saw an oppressed nation unfurl the banner of freedom. Three years earlier, Thomas Jefferson, who was then our Secretary of State, had said: "We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own is founded—that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases and change these forms at its own will." Then, President Wilson, speaking in 1916, said: "The small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial in-

<sup>1</sup> Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) on Nov. 25 (U.S. delegation press release 3093). The committee had before it two draft resolutions prepared by the Commission on Human Rights and a draft resolution prepared by the Economic and Social Council, all contained in ECOSOC resolution 586 D (XX).



tegrity that great and powerful states expect and insist on."

This, Madam Chairman, is the heritage of my country, and it is on this heritage that our belief in the principle of self-determination is firmly based. I am certain that the devotion of other free nations to the principle of self-determination rests on similar foundations.

In spite of the difficulties which have been encountered in defining and applying self-determination, the basic concept or principle commands our strongest support. Moreover, that the principle has gained wider emphasis in the last half century may be seen from the fact that, while the word was not mentioned in the covenant of the League of Nations, it is inscribed twice in the charter of the United Nations. I think that my country can be justifiably proud of the fact that, while President Wilson tried but failed to get a mention of self-determination into the covenant, the United States delegation at San Francisco took a prominent part in getting it into the charter of the United Nations.

More recently, at the Manila conference in 1954, to be exact, the delegates of Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, and the Kingdom of Thailand joined with the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Australia, and New Zealand in a joint declaration of their devotion to the principles of freedom. You will recall that these nations in becoming signatories to what came to be known as the Pacific Charter<sup>2</sup> proclaimed that, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, they upheld the principle of equal right and self-determination of peoples and that they would earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities.

The principle of self-determination, as we conceive of it, is reflected in the charter of the United Nations, signed in San Francisco. Indeed, so fundamental was the belief of the drafters of the charter in self-determination that they clearly stated that the development of friendly relations among nations, based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, was one of the purposes of the United Nations.

The thinking of the members of the United

Nations regarding self-determination has been reflected over the years in debates in the General Assembly and its committees, in the Economic and Social Council, and in the Human Rights Commission. No one who has read the records of these debates can help but be impressed by the fact that, although everyone professes devotion to the principle of self-determination, there is serious disagreement over its implications and applications. There are widely varying interpretations of its meaning, and there are sometimes diametrically opposing opinions as to what should be done. Let me cite a few examples of the different and conflicting views which have emerged in United Nations forums in recent years.

Some assert or imply, for example, that the obvious solution should be independence for every non-self-governing territory and trust territory in the shortest possible time. This they advocate in spite of the obvious fact that chaos might result.

Another group gives primary emphasis to economic and social development of non-self-governing territories and trust territories as the essential basis for the evolution of democratic political institutions and the attainment of self-government as well as, where appropriate, independence.

Yet another group maintains that self-determination means that every national, ethnic, or political group has a right to secede. This concept has an obvious appeal with respect to states where such groups are suppressed and where their rights to cultural autonomy are denied. If applied without wisdom, however, such a concept could be most harmful. In fact, self-determination carried to a logical but absurd extreme would in fact threaten the very existence of most of the states members of the United Nations. We learned our lesson through bitter experience, namely, the War Between the States. It took a civil war to teach us that unbridled self-determination which ignored other considerations important to the welfare of peoples and nations was impossible if our nation was to survive.

There is still another group which has its own interpretation as to the meaning of self-determination. This group would have you believe that the only countries which prevent self-determination are the traditional colonial empires. At the same time, however, it has reduced to servitude

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

some 800 million people who were once truly independent peoples. This new imperialism has made a mockery of the right of those once free peoples to self-determination.

In order further to put the problem of self-determination into perspective and because this is such an extremely important point, Madam Chairman, I think it worth while to go into some detail.

At its 677th plenary meeting on September 14, 1957, the General Assembly after having considered the report of a special committee consisting of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia, and Uruguay, adopted resolution 1133 (XI) by a vote of 60 in favor, 10 against, and 10 abstentions. Let me quote from a few of its operative paragraphs and you can judge for yourself what I mean by this new form of imperialism. I'll start with operative paragraph 4:

*Finds* that the conclusions reached by the Committee on the basis of its examination of all available evidence confirm that:

(a) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in violation of the charter of the United Nations, has deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental human rights;

(b) The present Hungarian régime has been imposed on the Hungarian people by the armed intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

(c) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has carried out mass deportations of Hungarian citizens to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

(d) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has violated its obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

(e) The present authorities in Hungary have violated the human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty of Peace with Hungary . . .

Then, as you recall, the resolution goes on to condemn the Soviet Union for "these acts and the continued defiance of the resolutions of the General Assembly."<sup>3</sup>

I genuinely regret that I have had to revive bitter memories by calling the committee's attention to this resolution, Madam Chairman. I felt compelled to do so, however, because of the apparent acceptance by some members of this committee of the view that people are deprived of self-determination solely by the traditional colonial powers. The basis for this acceptance is totally erroneous. Think, for example, of the countries which were once colonies and which

have in recent years become members of the United Nations as free and independent peoples—India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Libya, the Philippines, Indonesia, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Malaya, Laos, Cambodia, and Nepal. This impressive list of new countries which were once a part of the traditional colonial powers proves to me how accurate the late President Magsaysay of the Philippines was when he warned,

The colonialism that threatens Asia today is world communism. Nations which have won their freedom from old-style colonialism now face the danger of losing that freedom. A good defense against this threat is a healthy Asian nationalism, a nationalism which defends the right of all Asian peoples to self-determination. We support this kind of nationalism as a rallying point for all free Asians against the focus of aggression and subversion.

Madam Chairman, as I said before, all of us agree as to the importance of the principle of self-determination. And yet, as I have tried to point out by the above illustrations, few are in agreement as to defining the concept and as to its practical application. Many believe that self-determination is a purely political concept. Yet in the first resolution before us is the concept of the permanent sovereignty of nations over their natural resources. Surely this is partly an economic matter. Then again, for some delegations here it is also a legal and constitutional matter.

All members of the United Nations should be concerned with developing the means whereby the United Nations might be most effectively utilized in bringing about agreement on solutions to the many complex problems which have arisen and inevitably will continue to arise in the application of the principle. No member of the United Nations will deny the validity and rightness of the principle of self-determination; it has been affirmed by all states which have adhered to the charter. With this basic agreement we think that it must be possible for us to follow a course of progress in implementing the principle and at the same time give due consideration to the divergent views which have been expressed during the last few years. We have maintained and we continue to maintain that a clearer understanding of the principle itself and its applicability will enhance the possibility for more valuable and constructive recommendations. It was in this spirit and with this intent that my delegation sponsored the reso-

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1957, p. 524.

lution at the 20th session of the Economic and Social Council which is now before you.

Most members of this committee are fully aware of our position on the resolutions now before us. Suffice it to say possibly that we do not think the adoption of the first would be useful; in fact we fear it would be harmful. Due to the economic and legal implications which it contains we regret that shortage of time has not allowed us the benefit of the views of the Second and Sixth Committees.

With reference to the second resolution we frankly believe that it is unsound, because to us it is indefensible to leave the identification of such a situation to any 10 members in view of the oft expressed wide differences of opinion as to the principle of self-determination itself as well as its applicability. We believe that such a commission would only duplicate functions of United Nations bodies already existent, such as the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council. Incidentally, Madam Chairman, I have been impressed by delegations which have ignored General Assembly resolution 1133 (XI), concerning Hungary, and at the same time have paid cynical lip service in this committee by announcing their support for this resolution.

As to the third or ECOSOC resolution, we still believe that, due to the wide variety of opinions concerning both the principle and its implementation, to adopt the resolution along with these suggested amendments would be the wisest and most useful course.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Committee III on Nov. 26 adopted draft resolution I, calling for establishment of a commission to conduct a full survey of "the status of the permanent sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth and resources . . ."; the vote was 52 to 15 (U.S.) with 4 abstentions. The committee voted to postpone action on draft resolution II, which would establish a commission to examine any situation resulting from alleged denial or inadequate realization of the right of self-determination; the vote was 39 to 7 with 24 abstentions. The draft resolution prepared by ECOSOC, which would establish an *ad hoc* commission to conduct a thorough study of the concept of self-determination, was rejected by a vote of 16 to 48 (U.S.) with 8 abstentions. In plenary session on Dec. 12 the President of the Assembly proposed that the members of the commission recommended in draft resolution I should be: the United Arab Republic, Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Netherlands, Sweden, Guatemala, Chile, the U.S.S.R., and the United States. The resolution was then adopted by a vote of 52 to 15 (U.S.) with 8 abstentions.

#### STATEMENT BY MRS. LORD<sup>1</sup>

The United States voted against the resolution entitled "Recommendations Concerning International Respect for the Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination: Establishment of a Commission," as contained in the rapporteur's report, which is document A/4019, dated December 3, 1958. I want to take this opportunity to explain the reasons for our doing so.

First, and most emphatically, no one questions the power of countries to control and to use their natural wealth and resources as they see fit, provided that they respect their obligations under contract and under international law.

Secondly, neither should our voting against this resolution be interpreted to mean that we are against the desirability of promoting, to use the words of the United Nations Charter, "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." The United States, as it has in the past, continues to sympathize fully with the desires of peoples to achieve equal rights and self-determination at the earliest possible moment.

We are opposed to this resolution because in our opinion it is against the best interests of the less developed countries. Past experience has shown without question that such resolutions have had unfortunate repercussions. Those who are in the position to supply private capital could not help but ask themselves whether a country which voted in favor of a resolution containing the words "permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources" might not likewise feel fully justified in terminating contracts or expropriating property without compensation. In other words, Mr. President, we feared that the adoption of this resolution might adversely affect that important element called "investment climate" among potential investors, regardless of the reasons which might be cited in favor of the resolution.

In this regard, I was greatly interested to read several days ago the final declaration of the 45th National Foreign Trade Convention, which met here in New York November 17 through 19 of this year. With your permission, and because it helps to further clarify the basis for our mis-

<sup>1</sup> Made in plenary session on Dec. 12 (U.S. delegation press release 3130).



givings, I would like to quote one particular paragraph from this document. Under chapter 2, entitled "Expansion of Private Investment Abroad," it reads:

**The Foreign Trade Convention**

Urges that our Government continue to seek through improvements in our commercial treaty structure and through the appropriate means, the establishment of conditions designed to encourage and safeguard private investments abroad. Good faith and integrity are basic requirements in the creation or maintenance of an economic and political environment favorable to the flow of private investment capital. Sanctity of contract, security of property rights are of paramount importance. As a means to the assurance of these requisites, the Convention urges that our Government vigorously strive to gain acceptance by all nations of the principle that agreements must be observed and property rights respected.

Mr. President, my Government does not question the sovereignty of a country over its natural wealth and resources. Nor, as can be seen from the above statement, does this group of potential suppliers of foreign private investment capital question it. Indeed, I think it can safely be said that we all believe that private capital is the type of capital import least likely to interfere with the exercise of sovereignty. What is important, however, in the minds of potential investors are the prospects for receiving fair treatment and for having the sanctity of contract respected.

So much, Mr. President, for the reasons for our voting against the resolution before us today. Since ours does not represent the thinking of the majority, there will be a commission to study this aspect of self-determination. For two reasons, my Government has expressed its willingness to serve on this commission.

First, our original fears have been somewhat lessened by statements in the Third Committee on the part of supporters of this resolution reaffirming their belief in the sanctity of contract under international law and that sanctity of contract under international law will be respected in the study which this commission is to undertake. We hope, in fact, that this will be the case.

Secondly, we believe that, now that this commission is coming into existence, it behooves all of us to do our utmost to make it as effective and as useful a body as possible.

We therefore welcome the privilege of serving on such a commission.

**TREATY INFORMATION**

**Air Transport Agreements Amended With Brazil and Japan**

**BRAZIL**

Press release 34 dated January 15

Notes were exchanged at Washington on December 1, 1958,<sup>1</sup> between the Department of State and the Brazilian Embassy to amend the route schedule of the air transport agreement between Brazil and the United States [effective October 6, 1946, as amended December 30, 1950].<sup>2</sup> The new schedule, which went into effect December 1, reads as follows:

**SCHEDULE**

A. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States of America shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified via intermediate points in both directions and to make scheduled landings in Brazil at the points specified in this paragraph:

1. From the United States of America, via intermediate points in the Caribbean, Central America, and countries on the West Coast of South America to São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
2. From the United States of America, via intermediate points in the Caribbean and South America, to Belém, Natal and beyond to Africa.
3. From the United States of America, via intermediate points in the Caribbean, Panama, and countries on the North and East Coasts of South America to Belém or Manaus, Brasília, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Porto Alegre and beyond Brazil to Uruguay and Argentina and beyond to Antarctica and beyond.
4. From the United States of America, via intermediate points in Middle America and countries on the North and East Coasts of South America to Belém or Manaus, Brasília, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Porto Alegre and beyond Brazil to Uruguay and Argentina.

B. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States of Brazil shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified via intermediate points in both directions and to make scheduled landings in the United States of America at the points specified in this paragraph:

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1900 and 2190.



1. From the United States of Brazil, via intermediate points in South America and Middle America to Los Angeles and Honolulu and beyond to Japan and beyond.

2. From the United States of Brazil, via intermediate points in South America and the Caribbean, including Puerto Rico, to Miami and Chicago and beyond to Canada.

3. From the United States of Brazil, via intermediate points in South America and the Caribbean, including Puerto Rico, to Washington and New York and beyond to Canada.

C. Any point or points on any route or routes contained in this Route Schedule may be omitted in either or both directions at the option of the airline designated to operate such route or routes.

D. The airlines designated by one contracting party in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement will be permitted to operate other services across the territory of the other contracting party without obligation of landing by the most direct route between the points to be served as long as the safety of operation is not affected. In any case, the use of uneconomic and circuitous routings shall be avoided.

E. Flights of a designated airline which do not serve all the points granted in the routes contained in the Route Schedule may be operated by the most direct route between the points to be served so long as the safety of operation is not affected. In any case, the use of uneconomic and circuitous routings shall be avoided.

F. The airlines designated in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement by one contracting party will be permitted to land for non-traffic purposes in the territory of the other contracting party. Every airport in the territory of one of the contracting parties which is open to public use by its national aircraft shall be open under uniform conditions to the aircraft of the other contracting party for such non-traffic purposes.

G. For the purposes of this Annex to the Agreement, the term "Middle America" is interpreted as including only those countries situated on the mainland between South America and the continental United States of America.

## JAPAN

Press release 30 dated January 14

An exchange of notes<sup>3</sup> was concluded on January 14 between the U.S. Embassy at Tokyo and the Foreign Ministry of Japan amending the civil air transport agreement effective September 15, 1953, between the United States and Japan.<sup>4</sup> The amendment resulted from consultations held at Tokyo beginning in April 1958.

The amendment adds Los Angeles to the U.S. West Coast terminals to which airlines of Japan may operate. The unlimited "beyond" rights

which Japan previously held at San Francisco are now divided between San Francisco and Los Angeles. Under the new arrangement it will be possible for Japan Air Lines to include Los Angeles on flights between Japan and South America. The amendment discontinues the right of Japan Air Lines to route flights beyond San Francisco to South America.

The consultations also clarified other important phases of civil air operations between the United States and Japan. The two delegations concluded that the present state of air-transport development, the rapid growth of the volume of traffic, and the need to insure the further orderly development of the airlines are amply safeguarded by the terms of the 1953 agreement.

As amended, the route schedule is completely restated as follows:

### SCHEDULE

An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States of America shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified via intermediate points, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in Japan at the points specified in this paragraph:

1. From the United States, including Alaska, via intermediate points in Canada, Alaska and the Kurile Islands, to Tokyo and beyond.
2. From the United States, including its territorial possessions, via intermediate points in the Central Pacific, to Tokyo and beyond.
3. From Okinawa to Tokyo.

An airline or airlines designated by the Government of Japan shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified via intermediate points, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in the United States of America at the points specified in this paragraph:

1. From Japan, via intermediate points in the Central Pacific, to Honolulu and beyond:
  - a) to Los Angeles and beyond to points in South America.
  - b) to San Francisco and beyond to points other than in South America.
2. From Japan, via intermediate points in the North Pacific and Canada, to Seattle.
3. From Japan to Okinawa and beyond.\*

Points on any of the specified routes may at the option of the designated airlines be omitted on any or all flights.

\*In granting these routes, the respective Contracting Parties are cognizant of the provisions of Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, under which the United States of America exercises the powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over Okinawa. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> TIAS 2854.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Agriculture

Protocol of amendment to the convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences of January 15, 1944 (TS 987). Opened for signature at Washington December 1, 1958. Enters into force 1 month after the date on which all parties to the convention have deposited their instruments of ratification or adherence to the protocol.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* United States, January 7, 1959.

#### Fisheries

Protocol amending the international convention for the northwest Atlantic fisheries of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington June 25, 1956.

*Ratification deposited:* France, January 10, 1959.

*Entered into force:* January 10, 1959.

#### Trade and Commerce

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Dominican Republic, November 20, 1958.

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force October 7, 1957. TIAS 3930.

*Signature (with statement):* Dominican Republic, October 27, 1958.

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Dominican Republic, November 20, 1958.

Procès verbal of rectification concerning the protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX, the protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III, and the protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Dominican Republic, October 27, 1958.

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Haiti, October 30, 1958.

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Federation of Malaya and Greece, October 14, 1958; Ceylon, October 17, 1958; United Kingdom, October 20, 1958; Haiti, October 30, 1958; Czechoslovakia, November 6, 1958; Italy, November 7, 1958; Canada, November 10, 1958.

Declaration extending standstill provisions of article XVI: 4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Partially in force, section B of the procès verbal having entered into force Oct. 7, 1957, as a result of the entry into force on that date of the protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the general agreement.

*Signatures:* Federation of Malaya, October 14, 1958; Ceylon and Luxembourg, October 17, 1958; Austria, October 28, 1958; Haiti and Indonesia, October 30, 1958; Finland and United Kingdom, November 21, 1958; Italy, December 1, 1958; Netherlands, December 16, 1958.

#### United Nations

Charter of the United Nations and statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945 (59 Stat. 1031).

*Admission to membership:* Guinea, December 12, 1958.

### BILATERAL

#### Ecuador

Agreement extending the agreement of April 24, 1957 (TIAS 3833), for the establishment and operation of a rawinsonde observation station at Guayaquil. Effected by exchange of notes at Quito November 18 and December 30, 1958. Entered into force December 30, 1958.

#### Iceland

Agreement amending the agreement of February 23, 1957 (TIAS 3787), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik October 2 and November 27, 1958. Entered into force November 27, 1958.

#### Peru

Agreement extending the agreement of April 17, 1957 (TIAS 3823), for the establishment and operation of a rawinsonde observation station at Lima, Peru. Effected by exchange of notes at Lima November 13 and December 24, 1958. Entered into force December 24, 1958.

#### United Kingdom

Agreement amending the agreement of May 10 and 13, 1957 (TIAS 3843), relating to the disposition of equipment and material no longer required in furtherance of the mutual defense assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at London December 17 and 30, 1958. Entered into force December 30, 1958.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

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Earl E. T. Smith as Ambassador to Cuba. (For an exchange of letters between the President and Ambassador Smith, see White House press release dated January 10.)

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28	1/13	Dulles: news conference.
*29	1/13	NATO economic experts visit U.S.
30	1/14	Air transport agreement with Japan.
31	1/14	Dulles: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
†32	1/14	Baghdad Pact meeting.
*33	1/15	Educational exchange (Ghana).
34	1/15	Air transport agreement with Brazil.
35	1/15	U.S.-Cuba relations.
36	1/16	Note to U.S.S.R. on surprise attack.
37	1/16	Dillon: "Imperatives of International Economic Growth."
†38	1/16	Satterthwaite: "The United States and the New Africa."
†39	1/16	Colombo Plan report.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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## *The Soviet Note on Berlin: An Analysis*

On November 27, 1958, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics handed the United States Ambassador in Moscow a communication relating to Berlin.

Similar notes were given by the Soviet Government to the Ambassadors of France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

In essence the Soviet notes demanded that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France abandon West Berlin.

Declaring the communication to be an attempt to rewrite history "by omission and by distortion," the Department of State has issued this analysis of the Soviet note, calling attention to the more important Soviet omissions and correcting the more obvious distortions. The analysis is a factual account of developments prior to, during, and after World War II which led to the present status of Berlin.

An appendix contains the official statements of the United States on the Berlin question, including the legal status of the city, plus other official statements of the Western powers and of NATO on the Berlin question.

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